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!THE WALTER S. OWEN LECTURE 
CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
MARY CONDON† 
I.! INTRODUCTION 
I would first like to express my deep gratitude to the UBC Faculty of Law for 
welcoming me as the Walter S. Owen Chair in Law for 2008–2009. I par-
ticularly want to express thanks to the Owen family for providing the law 
school with the opportunity to appoint someone in this capacity. I am 
pleased to participate in commemorating Walter Owen, who had many dis-
tinguished achievements and appointments over the course of his career. I 
should also add that reading the list of Owen lecturers who have preceded 
me is a humbling experience. 
The topic I have chosen to talk about tonight is the possible implications 
of the global financial crisis (“GFC”) for Canadian securities regulation. It 
seems particularly foolhardy to wade into these waters for a number of rea-
sons. One is that the crisis is not yet over, and it may yet take a number of un-
anticipated turns. Another related reason is that grappling effectively with 
these problems may require rethinking the entire architecture of interna-
tional financial systems—a rather ambitious task! But foolish as it may be, I 
thought I would attempt in this lecture to break off a little bit of this capa-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
†  2009 Walter S. Owen Chair in Law, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. Aside 
from some minor editorial re-formatting, this paper has not been substantially updated 
since it was delivered as a lecture on 26 March 2009. This paper represents the personal 
views of the author, and not those of the Ontario Securities Commission, of which the 
author is a Member. 
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cious topic by trying to articulate some of the challenges that the current fi-
nancial turmoil raises for securities regulators in Canada. Specifically, I want 
to concentrate my remarks about the effects of the GFC on Canadian securi-
ties regulation in three areas: (i) the possible effects of the GFC on recent 
discourses of securities regulation, by which I mean emerging philosophies 
such as “principles-based regulation” and “risk-based regulation”; (ii) the in-
creasing influence of international securities organizations, especially the In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), on domes-
tic regulation; and (iii) the burgeoning international debate about structural 
reforms to domestic regulatory arrangements in the financial sector. I need to 
start, however, with a little primer on the major elements of the GFC as it is 
currently understood. 
II. THE CAUSES OF THE GFC
The GFC can be described as something of a witches’ brew, which has a 
number of unsavoury elements. There is a good deal of consensus in the me-
dia, among knowledgeable commentators, and in emerging academic ac-
counts about the elements of the crisis, although not about the direction of 
“causality.” For example, most commentators agree that the securitization of 
mortgage products (whereby packages of mortgage loans were pooled by 
creditors, sold to special purpose vehicles, and then fragmented again as in-
vestment opportunities to third parties) was a major factor in the crisis. 
There is less agreement on why the mortgage securitization market collapsed. 
Was it caused primarily by irresponsible behaviour on the part of low-income 
earners who took out mortgages they could not afford, leading to widespread 
defaults on those mortgages and therefore no stream of income to pay inves-
tors? Or, alternatively, was it caused by a concerted push by financial service 
providers to generate revenue through irresponsible and less-than-
transparent lending activities?1 Those commentators who espouse the latter 
view point to the trend towards the “originate to distribute” model of securi-
tizing assets that was engaged in by investment banks and other financial in-
1  See Shannon O’Byrne & Ronnie Cohen, Address (Paper presented to the workshop on 
Managing Business Risk at Green College, University of British Columbia, January 2009) 
[unpublished]; Peter Gowan, “Crisis in the Heartland” (2009) 55 New Left Review 5. 
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stitutions. This is claimed to have had the effect of loosening the risk-based 
oversight such institutions would normally engage in. In other words, mort-
gage providers no longer cared about the credit worthiness or ability to pay 
of the mortgage holder because they had dispersed the risk of default in the 
underlying assets to third-party investors in the securitized investments. 
These pools of assets were often sold and re-sold in tranches that had differ-
ent credit ratings associated with them. Other assets underlying the invest-
ment opportunities could be corporate debt obligations (“CDO”), such as 
bonds or debentures; hence the term collateralized debt obligations. The size 
of the CDO market grew from $275 billion in 2000 to $4.7 trillion in 2006. 
By 2002, asset-backed securitizations began to exceed the total amount of 
conventional debt securities issued by public corporations in the U.S.2 Com-
pounding the phenomenon of the growth of the CDO market was another 
development whereby the leverage ratios of U.S. investment banks—that is, 
the ratio of net capital they needed to keep on their balance sheets to fund 
their liabilities—were also reduced by regulators in the U.S. in the mid-
2000s.3 To be eligible for this reduction, investment banks voluntarily en-
tered the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity Program.4 This meant that 
these institutions were particularly vulnerable to declining asset holdings 
causing capital shortfalls. 
Another major focus during this period has been the activities and busi-
ness model of the credit rating agencies, a highly concentrated service within 
the financial services industry. These agencies played a very significant role in 
providing a credit rating for the tranches of assets and receivables that were 
securitized and sold to investors in over-the-counter transactions. It is one 
thing when the bank that originates a mortgage or a credit card then securi-
tizes those assets in a separate vehicle and sells tranches of them to other in-
vestors; it is another thing when the parties to a derivative contract that is 
linked to an underlying set of assets or an underlying “reference entity” have 
2  John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, “Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Bet-
ter Idea?” (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 342, 1 November 2008) at 
28, online: SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309776>. 
3  Gowan, supra note 1 at 15; Coffee & Sale, supra note 2 at 21. 
4  Coffee & Sale, ibid. 
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no ownership or creditor interest at all in the underlying reference entity. As 
the credit derivatives market grew throughout the last decade, this transfor-
mation of the use of derivatives from a risk hedging device on the part of 
creditors to an opportunity to speculate on the economic fortunes of an un-
derlying reference entity contributed significantly, first to this market’s stag-
gering growth, and later to its ultimate fragility. 
A prominent example of this type of transaction was the credit default 
swap (“CDS”), where a protection buyer (often one of the new breed of spe-
cialist credit hedge funds) enters into a contract to buy protection from the 
risk of default of the chosen underlying entity (e.g. General Electric) from a 
protection seller. The protection buyer makes payments to the protection 
seller to this end. If the underlying reference entity defaults on its obligations, 
such as an obligation to make an interest payment on debt securities, the pro-
tection buyer gets paid by the protection seller. That protection seller, of 
course, increasingly came to be the current pariah of the insurance system, 
AIG. Between 2001 and 2007, the size of the CDS market grew from $920 
billion to $62 trillion. There is a very cogent account of this phenomenon in 
Janis Sarra’s recent paper on the credit derivatives market, where she demon-
strates how the growth of the CDS market worked to skew traditional incen-
tive structures.5 In a manner similar to short selling, protection buyers could 
be more interested in the underlying reference entity failing than in it suc-
ceeding, because the value to the protection buyer of having the credit event 
triggered could be significant, depending on the size of the derivative con-
tract. Finally, the circle gets squared, as it were, when it turns out that one 
type of CDO that it was possible to buy was a form in which the underlying 
pool of assets were a group of CDSs, thus trading a derivative of a derivative.6 
5  Janis Sarra, “The Conceptualization and Management of Risk in Financial Products Mar-
kets and Bank Capital Requirements, New Winds or Shifting Sands?” (Paper presented 
to the workshop on Managing Business Risk at Green College, University of British Co-
lumbia, January 2009) [unpublished]. 
6  See Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, Regulatory Study, Review 
and Recommendations concerning the manufacture and distribution by IIROC member 
firms of Third-Party Asset-Backed Commercial Paper in Canada (October 2008), online: 
IIROC <http://docs.iiroc.ca/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=3CAB660DB44  
E41C2875DD3DBD27FADEA&Language=en>. 
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Expanding the cast of characters involved in the crisis further, various as-
sociations of institutional investors have publicly engaged in self-criticism for 
not probing more aggressively the solidity of the underlying assets of various 
derivative products in which they invested. Another related debate is 
whether excessive compensation packages for key banking or insurance com-
pany employees designing, underwriting, and trading these credit derivative 
products was merely a symptom of the credit market bubble or were in fact a 
prominent cause of excessive risk-taking, in the sense that the increased 
short-term profitability of derivatives trading units within banks was a driver 
of compensation bonuses. The saga of the political frenzy over the compen-
sation packages payable to AIG officials is an obvious example of this theory.  
In all of this, Canada’s financial system has been relatively unscathed, a 
fact that has caused the country to be a source of some envy among financial 
sector watchers internationally. However, Canada may have been the canary 
in the coal mine in that our home-grown asset-backed commercial paper 
(“ABCP”) crisis, which erupted in 2007, involved the freezing up of the mar-
ket for short-term commercial paper, which was ultimately backed by similar 
assets to those that have proven toxic world-wide. A major element of the 
Canadian version of the crisis was that the commercial paper being sold was 
designed to involve a short term to maturity, whereas the assets underlying 
the notes involved long-term liabilities such as mortgages and other loans. As 
the health of the underlying assets began to appear fragile and produce less 
income, new buyers of notes became scarce and sellers had insufficient cash 
to redeem them. It should also be acknowledged that the portion of the 
ABCP market that actually froze in 2007 was the non-bank sponsored prod-
ucts.7 
How does securities regulation connect into all this? There are several 
ways in which it is implicated in this ongoing saga, both directly and indi-
rectly. One point of connection is that securities regulators, in principle, 
regulate the issuing and trading of securities by banks and other financial ser-
vice providers, including ABCP.8 Insofar as investors purchased these finan-
7  See ibid. 
8  As discussed later, the threshold legal question of whether certain kinds of derivatives are 
securities is a vexed one. 
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cial products, securities regulators are mandated to provide protection.9 
More generally, the way in which financial sector regulation is conceptual-
ized, organized, and fragmented among a number of regulatory bodies, in-
cluding securities, banking and insurance regulators, is a major subject for 
ongoing debate. 
III. WHITHER PBR/RBR? 
One matter of considerable debate elsewhere,10 is whether regulators them-
selves contributed to the crisis. This question relates both to the philosophies 
of regulation that undergird what financial regulators do and the way that 
regulatory authority is divided among different bodies. Two of the most 
prominent trends in regulatory theory generally, and financial sector regula-
tion more specifically, has been the move to “principles-based regulation” 
(“PBR”) on the one hand, and “risk-based regulation” on the other.11 PBR is a 
particularly live issue in the Canadian context, because the final report of the 
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, which was set up by the federal gov-
ernment in 2008 and which reported earlier this year, expressed considerable 
confidence in the concept of PBR as applied to securities regulation.12 I 
should add that this was in significant measure because of Professor Cristie 
Ford’s extremely cogent and thoughtful presentation of the issues connected 
to a move to PBR in the background research paper she prepared for the Ex-
pert Panel.13 A shift to PBR was also recommended by the U.S. Treasury De-
                                                          
9  See e.g. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 1.1. 
10  Especially in places like the U.K. 
11  See Mary Condon, “Comparative Models of Risk-based Financial Services” (Paper pre-
pared for the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, 31 October 2007), online: Blake 
Cassels & Graydon <http://www.blakes.com/english/practiceareas/pensionsOECP/        
papers/5%20Comparative%20Models%20of%20Risk-based%20Financial%20Services         
.%20Condon%20.pdf>. 
12  See Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: 
Department of Finance Canada, 12 January 2009), online: Expert Panel <http://www        
.expertpanel.ca/eng/documents/Expert_Panel_Final_Report_And_Recommendations         
.pdf>. 
13  See Cristie Ford, “Principles-Based Securities Regulation” (Paper prepared for the Expert 
Panel on Securities Regulation, 12 January 2009), online: Expert Panel <http://www        
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partment, in its “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” 
published last year.14 
So what is PBR? It is generally taken to have the following components: 
· promulgation of high-level standards that are drafted at a broad level of 
generality; 
· a focus on an outcomes-based approach, which is concerned more with 
whether a regulatory participant achieves a certain outcome, such as 
“treating customers fairly” than whether it abides by universally-applied 
procedural rules drafted by a regulator; 
· a commitment to enhanced stakeholder participation in the design of 
principles; 
· increased responsibility of regulated entities’ senior management for the 
implementation of principles within firms; and 
· reliance on constant improvement of industry best practices and guid-
ance with respect to best practices rather than prescriptive rule-making. 
The Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) in the U.K., an integrated fi-
nancial regulator responsible for regulating a broad range of financial service 
providers, including banks and securities firms, has been the most enthusias-
tic exponent of PBR. However, as Julia Black put it in December 2008: 
[PBR] invoked a re-framing of the regulatory relationship from one of di-
recting and controlling to one based on responsibility, mutuality and trust. 
… The regulated would adopt a self-reflective approach to developing proc-
esses and practices to meet the goals, and both would trust each other to ful-
fil their side of this new regulatory bargain. What was killed in this crisis was 
not the desirability of this vision, but the possibility that the trust on which 
                                                                                                                           
.expertpanel.ca/eng/reports/research-studies/principles-based-securities-regulation-
ford.html>. 
14  U.S., Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Struc-
ture (March 2008), online: Department of the Treasury <http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf>. 
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it has to be based could be re-formed in the near future, or even at all. The 
trust has gone …15 
Somewhat more pungently, Hector Sants, the chief executive of the FSA, 
has said that “a principles-based approach does not work with participants 
who have no principles.”16 
While there may be an element of rhetorical posturing here, one empiri-
cal question to ask is whether that trust between financial market partici-
pants and regulators has been as severely impaired in Canada as it has else-
where, such that PBR can still work in Canadian securities regulation. The 
logic of PBR assumes an underlying theory about how organizations behave. 
That theory is that organizations will typically seek to achieve regulator-
sanctioned outcomes if they are relatively easy to follow and if competitors 
also comply with them. There is well-respected empirical work in the law and 
society tradition that purports to demonstrate the truth of these proposi-
tions.17 I have myself subscribed to this approach in some of my earlier 
work.18 The intriguing question is whether this theory of organizational be-
haviour, as it applies to financial institutions, remains robust after the GFC. 
It is true, of course, that much of what I described earlier as the elements of 
the GFC did not necessarily encompass illegal activities, though it may have 
involved excessive risk-taking. It is also true that, as the crisis unfolded, some 
firms financially supported their money market funds or special investment 
vehicles even when they were not contractually required to do so. This sug-
gests that some financial institutions did more than was legally necessary, 
                                                          
15  Julia Black, “The death of credit, trust—and principles based regulation?” Risk and Regu-
lation (December 2008) 8, online: Risk and Regulation <http://www.lse.ac.uk/                
collections/CARR/pdf/RiskRegulationFinancialCrisis2008.pdf>. 
16  Peter Thal Larsen, “Gloves to come off as FSA ends ‘light touch’ era” Financial Times (13 
March 2009), online: Financial Times <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ e3cd02de-0f6f-
11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html>. 
17  See e.g., Neil Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, “Regulation and Business Behavior” 
(2005) 27 Law & Pol’y 213; OECD, Public Management Committee, Reducing the Risk 
of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance (2000), online: OECD <http://        
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/54/1910833.pdf>. 
18  See Mary Condon, “Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in Ontario Securities Regu-
lation” (2006) 32 Queen’s L.J. 1. 
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though whether this was prompted by a concern for their reputation, to 
avoid additional regulatory scrutiny, or more altruistically to do the “right 
thing,” is a matter that would repay close empirical examination. Thus, it may 
be the case that different financial institutions, no less than in other business 
sectors, are positioned differently with respect to a willingness to embrace 
PBR. 
But, at the very least, the GFC appears to demonstrate that if PBR is to 
work, such that market participants embrace results-oriented principles in 
their own internal processes, regulators need to be more hard-nosed about 
taking the organizational culture and internal incentives of regulated partici-
pants more directly into account. Coffee and Sale’s recent analysis of the cri-
sis with respect to the U.S. points to the role of “competitive pressure and the 
need to establish a strong position in a new and expanding market” as signifi-
cant factors contributing to the lack of self-discipline exhibited by invest-
ment banks operating in the credit derivatives area.19 In a similar vein, McIl-
roy argues that the growth of securitizations was a “market response to the 
strictures of the First Basel Capital Accord”, which required banks to hold 
specified reserves of capital which weighted corporate lending as requiring 
more capital reserves than mortgage lending.20 Furthermore, “securitisation 
became seen as an essential way of offloading loans in order to free up regula-
tory capital so that further loans could be made.”21 It could well be that case 
that internal organizational cultures within Canadian financial institutions 
are materially different from those driving profit-making in the U.S. and the 
U.K., which might preserve a space for a rigorous outcome-oriented ap-
proach to take hold. For example, banks in Canada have a stronger commit-
ment to retail depositors than the investment banks at the centre of the GFC 
in the U.S., though this is by definition not true of hedge funds. 
Finally, given that PBR proposes that ultimate responsibility for achiev-
ing outcomes should lie with senior management, what should we make of 
the fact that the U.K. House of Commons Treasury Committee was sur-
                                                          
19  Coffee & Sale, supra note 2 at 27 
20  David Halliday McIlroy, “Regulating risk: A measured response to the banking crisis” 
(2008) 9 Journal of Banking Regulation 284 at 290. 
21  Ibid. 
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prised in the fall of last year to discover that “the Chairman of the UK 
branch of a leading investment bank could not explain to us what a CDO is, 
a financial product in which he told us that his organisation deals”?22 
A. RISK-BASED REGULATION 
Meanwhile, one dominant lesson of the GFC for securities regulators is the 
need to pay renewed attention to issues of risk management. By this, I mean 
both risk management practices at a financial firm level, and the implementa-
tion of risk-based approaches at the regulatory level. Many accounts of what 
went wrong in the GFC identify inadequate techniques of risk management 
inside financial institutions as a key culprit. As Donald MacKenzie describes 
it: 
An investment bank with a big presence in the market will have thousands 
of positions in credit default swaps, CDOs, indices and similar products. 
The calculations needed to understand and hedge the exposure of this port-
folio to market movements are run, often overnight, on grids of several hun-
dred interconnected computers.23 
Thus, the technology required to adequately risk manage the complex prod-
ucts being traded may have been lacking. But the problem was clearly not just 
technological deficiencies. An important story here is also the superficiality, 
and ultimate failure, of the risk assessment techniques that were supposed to 
assist in making product design and trading decisions. 
It turns out that the risk of default in specific tranches of CDOs tended 
to be calculated by banks, not by piecing together the individual default risks 
of each element of an underlying package of assets or loans, but by seeing that 
risk as correlated with the trading prices of credit default swaps written on 
the same or similar assets. Since the CDS market was itself of quite recent 
origin, there was little historical analysis that went into the calculations of the 
risk of these asset pools defaulting, and therefore the accurate calculation of 
the prices at which they were being bought and sold. Much calumny has been 
heaped on the head of the hapless Canadian-educated statistician who is said 
                                                          
22  Ibid. at 288. 
23  Donald MacKenzie, “End-of-the-World Trade” London Review of Books (8 May 2008), 
online: London Review of Books <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n09/mack01_.html>. 
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to have designed this risk modeling convention, but the problem is obviously 
more about the widespread failure to interrogate the model as it became 
widely used in the derivatives market.24 
Risk issues were also a focus of a report by the so-called Senior Supervi-
sors Group, which reported in March 2008, before the GFC had fully ma-
tured.25 This group included the FSA, the SEC, the Federal Reserve, as well 
as banking regulators from France, Germany, and Switzerland. One very in-
teresting finding of this group of bank supervisors was that the banks that 
were surviving the crisis best were those that relied on robust internal risk as-
sessment processes, as opposed to relying primarily on external risk assess-
ment processes, such as those provided by credit rating agencies. Similar to 
the comments made above, they also identified as a problem the incorrect as-
sumptions that were made about how CDOs and CDSs would behave, espe-
cially the assumption that they would behave like more conventional corpo-
rate bonds. As the report put it, “[t]he focus on growth without an appropri-
ate focus on controls resulted in a substantial accumulation of assets and con-
tingent liability risk that was not well recognized.”26 The group therefore 
recommended more guidance from regulators on risk management practices, 
as well as on valuation practices, including the development of common ap-
proaches to the valuation of illiquid assets. In particular, it proposed the es-
tablishment of risk management committees that would discuss risk exposure 
issues across the firm, as well as timely provision of good information to sen-
ior management.  
Again, the issue we are interested in here is whether this should change 
anything that securities regulators do. In its report of earlier this year, the Ex-
pert Panel on Securities Regulation recommends that a guiding principle of 
regulatory conduct should be “facilitating the reduction of systemic risk, in-
cluding through monitoring of systemic events or developments and coop-
                                                          
24  See Felix Salmon, “Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street” Wired (17 
March 2009) 73, online: Wired <http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/         
wp_quant>. 
25  Senior Supervisors Group, “Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Re-
cent Market Turbulence” (6 March 2008), online: FSA <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/            
other/SSG_risk_management.pdf>. 
26  Ibid. at 7. 
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eration and coordination with other financial authorities”.27 In particular, the 
panel recommends increasing attention by securities regulators to the fact 
that it has become easier to access capital directly from capital markets rather 
than through traditional banking institutions, as well as to the introduction 
of increasingly complex financial instruments. It also noted with some con-
cern that market participants like hedge funds and private equity funds are 
less regulated and more opaque.  
So what might a renewed focus on risk regulation mean for securities 
regulators? Are these prescriptions from the Expert Panel sensible ones? I 
should note immediately that several provincial securities commissions, in-
cluding the Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) and the British Co-
lumbia Securities Commission (“BCSC”), consider themselves risk-based 
regulators already. For example, the BCSC has identified two major risks 
that it intends to prioritize for the 2009–12 period.28 They are unsuitable in-
vestments on the one hand and securities fraud on the other. The attention 
to unsuitable investments is specifically linked to the concern about retail in-
vestor involvement in the ABCP crisis, and builds on the work being done by 
the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (“IIROC”) in 
this area. The targeting of fraud is recognition that in a period of market de-
cline, retail investors may be more vulnerable to high-pressure sales pitches 
offering above average returns. Meanwhile, the OSC has focused in the past 
several months on proactively making contact with market participants such 
as investment funds and hedge funds, in order to gather information to de-
termine if there is compliance or other systemic problems within these or-
ganizations. The Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) have also been 
scrutinizing the disclosure of those Canadian reporting issuers that held ma-
terial amounts of ABCP, and of banks specifically, with respect to their secu-
ritization practices. Much of this focuses on the valuation methods used by 
originators and holders of ABCP to describe the fair value of these instru-
ments. The CSA has also made a number of recommendations in response to 
                                                          
27  Supra note 12 at 10. 
28  British Columbia Securities Commission, Service Plan 2009–2012 (6 August 2009) at 6. 
2010 THE WALTER S. OWEN LECTURE 485 
 
the credit market turmoil, notably with respect to the treatment of credit rat-
ing agencies, a topic to which I return below.29 
But what about the Expert Panel’s concern with systemic risk? What 
would this look like in a securities regulation context? One important re-
minder here is that securities regulators have a number of different points of 
contact with financial institutions like banks. Banks are issuers of equity se-
curities and, indeed, they have been engaging in this activity frequently in the 
recent past in order to access additional capital. As we saw they also increas-
ingly originate other investment products like asset or liability securitiza-
tions, and of course in Canada a bank will also be the parent of a market reg-
istrant that is performing a variety of investment banking and retail investor 
functions. In other words, the various business activities of banks will pro-
duce dispersed responses across a securities regulatory organization. In this 
context it is relevant that the FSA’s internal audit report on Northern Rock, a 
major U.K. mortgage lender, published last year, decried the failure of the 
agency to actually implement risk-based supervision for Northern Rock, de-
spite the FSA’s public and detailed commitment to a risk-based approach to 
regulation.30 The audit also found a level of organizational opaqueness 
within the FSA which prevented any one division from “taking ownership” 
of Northern Rock’s problems. No less than within financial institutions 
themselves, this example points to the need for an organizationally inte-
grated approach to the risk regulation engaged in by securities regulators. 
But it begs a bigger question as to whether the ultimate responsibility for 
overseeing internal risk management processes across financial institutions 
like banks should lie with securities regulators or with banking regulators. 
Banks in Canada do have “enterprise level risk management” processes, in 
which the securities dealer component, which is regulated by securities regu-
lators, is typically represented. The Office of the Superintendant of Financial 
Institutions (“OSFI”) is also committed to risk-based regulation, and has re-
                                                          
29  Canadian Securities Administrators, Securities Regulatory Proposals Stemming from the 
2007-08 Credit Market Turmoil and its Effect on the ABCP Market in Canada (6 October 
2008), online: BCSC <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/securitieslaw/policy1/           
CSA%20Consultation%20Paper%2011-405.pdf>. 
30  Financial Services Authority, The supervision of Northern Rock: A lessons learned review 
(March 2008), online: FSA <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/nr_report.pdf>. 
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cently, for example, signalled that it will consider issues related to compensa-
tion practices, to the extent that they increase the risk profile of the bank as a 
whole. Compensation practices generally have long been of interest to securi-
ties regulators, in relation to their corporate governance agenda. 
I will return to this issue of whether we should have integrated or diversi-
fied risk regulators later, and I will also return to the Expert Panel’s targeting 
of the increased complexity of financial instruments as a problem. But let me 
just conclude this comment on risk regulation by securities regulators by 
suggesting that what the GFC has shown us that it is not just problematic 
that there are inadequate models for pricing risk or that there are failures of 
risk controls within diversified financial organizations. Mainly it has shown 
us that markets themselves become fragile if the systems for guaranteeing the 
ongoing credibility of those markets don’t work well, producing the result that 
market participants don’t trade.31 Guaranteeing the credibility of a trading 
market through systems for promoting transparency of trades as well as the 
data that allows financial instruments to be valued, standardization of trad-
ing terms and minimizing the risk of trade failures seems to be an important 
element of the challenge facing securities regulators going forward. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
One phenomenon that has been in evidence over the last number of years, 
but has been accelerated by the GFC, is the internationalization of securities 
regulation and, in particular, the enlarged role played by IOSCO. In its Con-
sultation Paper of October 2008, the CSA explicitly notes that one of the 
principles guiding its work is to be that its “approach to responding to the 
Credit Turmoil should be consistent with international developments, in-
cluding initiatives led by, among others, … IOSCO, the SEC, the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators …, the Financial Stability Forum …, and 
the U.S. President’s Working Group on Financial Markets.”32 While there are 
IOSCO task forces examining issues of the regulatory approach to be taken 
to hedge funds and to unregulated products, the one that is furthest ad-
vanced at this point involves the regulation of credit rating agencies 
                                                          
31  See MacKenzie, supra note 23. 
32  Supra note 29 at 12–13 [citations omitted]. 
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(“CRAs”). Thus, the CSA proposes to establish a framework for the regula-
tion of CRAs that embeds the newly revised IOSCO Code of Conduct for 
CRAs into the domestic regulatory framework, while also allowing the CSA 
to require changes to a credit rating agency’s practices and procedures. The 
IOSCO Code of Conduct for CRAs is based on a “comply or explain” 
model. This is a model where the market participant discloses whether or not 
it is adhering to specific items identified in a code of best practice, and if it is 
not, explains how it is achieving the overall objectives of the code otherwise. 
The IOSCO code addresses issues such as conflicts of interest in a CRA’s 
business model, clarity about what ratings mean, and disclosure of historical 
information about the performance of ratings. The CSA is also considering 
whether to require public disclosure of all information provided by an issuer 
and used by a CRA in rating an asset-backed security. A similar proposal has 
been made by the SEC, which also regulates the CRAs currently operating in 
Canada. The idea here is to increase the transparency of the products being 
sold in the securitization market.  
The challenge with a project of international convergence, of course, is 
the appropriate balance to be drawn between international consistency and 
domestic autonomy. In the case of CRAs, this issue is not raised particularly 
starkly as there is only a single domestically-located credit rating agency in 
Canada, with the others operating primarily internationally. But more gener-
ally, to the extent that the Canadian capital markets differ materially from 
those in the United States, as Professor Nicholls found in his study for the 
TFMSL,33 the GFC raises the issue of the extent to which Canada’s response 
needs to be sensitive to local market conditions and participants. It is also in-
teresting to note that the “comply or explain” approach being adopted here 
for CRAs has apparently been rejected by the CSA in a different context, 
that of standards of corporate governance to be used by publicly-traded issu-
ers, via the proposed revisions to NI 58-101. The final major issue with re-
spect to the role of IOSCO is that the enforcement of the best practices es-
                                                          
33  Christopher Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and the Illustra-
tive Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley” (Paper pre-
pared for the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 15 June 2006), 
online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada <http://www.tfmsl            
.ca/docs/V4(3A)%20Nicholls.pdf>. 
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tablished by these kinds of international codes can only occur through the ef-
forts of domestic regulators, which has the effect of retaining autonomy for 
the domestic regulator, but may ultimately produce inconsistent results in 
the actual implementation of the codes. 
V. IS THERE A NEED FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM OF 
FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION IN CANADA? 
The final issue that I want to turn to is whether the distinction between the 
disclosure-oriented basis of securities regulation and the prudentially-
oriented basis of banking regulation continues to be the right division of re-
sponsibility for Canada. I raise this because the question of overarching re-
form of the structure of financial sector regulation is the subject of intense 
debate in a number of other countries, notably the U.S. and the U.K. Al-
though Julia Black cautioned in December that it would be a mistake to 
forge new regulatory structures before, as she put it, “the cocktail of causes is 
well understood”,34 this has not stopped the juggernaut of policy debate 
among political commentators, academics, and politicians. What is interest-
ing about the debate in the U.K. and the U.S. is that both jurisdictions come 
from very different places, in terms of their pre-existing structures, and the 
suggestion is that each move closer to the others’ arrangements. Thus, the 
proposal from the opposition Conservatives in the U.K. is that the integrated 
responsibilities currently exercised solely by the FSA be divided, with the 
prudential responsibilities of the FSA becoming exercisable by the Bank of 
England and the FSA retaining responsibility for business conduct issues. 
This distinction between a “business conduct” regulator and a “prudential” 
regulator is characterized as the “twin peaks” model.35 Meanwhile, there are 
various proposals for reform on the table in the U.S., which generally suggest 
variations on the theme of consolidation of a very fragmented system of sec-
tor-based regulation. Coffee and Sale suggest, for example, that prudential 
                                                          
34  Supra note 15. 
35  Eric J. Pan, “Structural Reform of Financial Regulation in Canada” (Paper prepared for 
the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, 12 January 2009) at 13–14, online: Expert 
Panel <http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-studies/Structural%20Reform          
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supervision of the safety and soundness of investment banks should be un-
dertaken by banking regulators, and that the SEC should maintain authority 
over consumer protection and oversight of business practices.36 They argue 
that the SEC should not be a prudential regulator, but that the prudential 
regulation of banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, and indeed all finan-
cial institutions that are “too big to fail” should be undertaken by the Federal 
Reserve.37 
In his research study for the Expert Panel on securities regulation, Eric 
Pan proposes that Canada adopt what he calls an “objectives-based ap-
proach”.38 This means that individual regulators should be organized in ac-
cordance with one of three categories of financial regulation: (i) prudential 
regulation; (ii) business conduct regulation; and (iii) market stability meas-
ures. He views it as essential that these regulators have clear lines of authority, 
share information freely and continuously, and coordinate regulatory actions. 
Pan points out that a common assumption is that the regulatory stance 
required to engage in prudential regulation is fundamentally different from 
that of business conduct regulation. In a prudential model, which focuses on 
assuring the financial soundness of institutions, the regulator tends to have a 
cooperative relationship with regulated entities, while in a business conduct 
model the regulator frequently assumes an adversarial stance with institu-
tions, because of its mandate to protect consumers of financial products. 
This is, of course, not exactly what happens in Canada at the moment. 
Securities regulators have some prudential responsibilities with respect to se-
curities dealers and other registrants, in tandem with self-regulatory organi-
zations. At the same time, they are not the only regulators responsible for 
business conduct issues, since the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada 
also plays a role here.39 I agree with Coffee and Sale’s point that trajectory of 
                                                          
36  See Coffee & Sale, supra note 2 at 7. 
37  Ibid. at 52. For a different set of proposals, see Howell E. Jackson, “A Pragmatic Approach 
to the Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the United States” (Harvard Pub-
lic Law Working Paper No. 09-19, 12 November 2008), online: SSRN <http://ssrn           
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38  Supra note 35 at 13. 
39  See IIROC, supra note 6 at 65. 
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a country’s regulatory reform should be forged from its own past and com-
mitments, rather than wholesale adoption of structural approach that derives 
from the logic of another jurisdiction’s politics and legal system. Thus Coffee 
and Sale argue that the reason why the U.K. chose a single regulator model in 
the first place had to do with the immediately preceding history of the crea-
tion of a set of self-regulatory authorities which were unable to cope with the 
widespread retailization of the financial markets that occurred in the U.K. 
during the Thatcher era. The question for Canada then is whether the dis-
tinction between the roles of OSFI and provincial securities regulators is an 
example of a healthy tension (both of philosophy and structure) or a frag-
mentation of regulatory oversight that has negative effects. 
While I cannot yet provide a definitive answer to this question, let me try 
to provide a concrete example of the dilemma here by circling back to where 
I started, which is with the phenomenon of the derivative itself. If the trading 
of derivatives was at the centre of the GFC, who is in fact charged with regu-
lating them in Canada? Who should regulate them? There is a proposal in 
the U.K. that derivative regulation there should be approached from a pru-
dential stance, which might require for example that banks not sell all the 
risks in the products they originate. This is also the approach favoured by 
Coffee and Sale in their recent article. Alternatively, should derivative regula-
tion be approached from a disclosure stance, which would require enhanced 
identification and quantification of risk? 
The background to the issue of the regulation of derivatives in Canada is 
a fascinating lesson in political economy and, specifically, some might argue, 
a demonstration of the influence of the highly concentrated Canadian bank-
ing sector on financial policy. In the mid-1990s, the OSC attempted to regu-
late the trading of over-the- counter derivatives, by proposing a rule to this ef-
fect, which relied heavily on exemptions from regulatory requirements for 
transactions involving sophisticated parties. The proposed rule prompted an 
adverse reaction from the banking sector and was never implemented. Simi-
larly, when the issue of the regulation of so-called “principal-protected notes” 
surfaced some years later, this was resolved by the assertion of jurisdiction by 
the federal Department of Finance. Despite the significant involvement of 
the retail investor sector in purchasing these products in the early 2000s, the 
logic here was that they were issued by federally-regulated financial institu-
tions, and that they operated more like deposits than investment products. 
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While disclosure requirements were imposed, their adequacy was monitored 
by the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada rather than securities regula-
tors. 
In my view, it is now a matter of some urgency that we re-open the debate 
about the appropriate approach to regulating derivatives in Canada. As a 
matter of public policy, we need to have a comprehensive though flexible 
framework here. If we adopt the functional distinction posited above be-
tween business conduct regulation and prudential regulation, it seems to me 
that the GFC has demonstrated that there are significant market-oriented 
and business conduct issues, such as transparency and pricing methodologies, 
which are raised by the proliferation of derivatives trading. This is not least 
because the players here are no longer only banks, but other investment enti-
ties as well, such as hedge funds and pension funds. Securities regulators, be-
cause of their expertise in transparency and the promotion of standardiza-
tion, need to be closely involved in designing such a regulatory framework. 
Let me close, then, with this simple thought. I would argue that the GFC 
has shown us that, far from regulation being a drag on markets as the neo-
classical law and economists would have it, regulation is actually intrinsic to 
the survival of markets.40 If we can accept that basic premise, the “only” mat-
ter left for debate about is how to effectively accomplish that regulation! 
Thank you all for your attention. 
                                                          
40  See Mary G. Condon, Making Disclosure: Ideas and Interests in Ontario Securities Regula-
tion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 
